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Among the examples on how not to portray a character in tragedy, Aristotle names the female 
protagonist of the Iphigenia in Aulis, claiming that she is drawn in violation of the principle 
of consistency: begging to spare her life she is much unlike her later self. Philologists stood 
for Euripides, charging Aristotle with a lack of intuitive understanding. Moreover, as has been 
pointed out, the unaffected character of Iphigenia’s behaviour could find a footing in the ample 
observations on human psychology Aristotle himself made elsewhere in the Ethics and Rheth-
oric. Certain modern scholars, however, tend to side with Aristotle. To argumentatively prove 
or disprove the feasibility of the change Iphigenia undergoes seems thus to be close to impos-
sible, both psychologically and aesthetically. A thought not alien to the Poetics goes as simple 
as that: not all the shifts and turns, so human and so easily observed in life, should find their 
way into art. One supposes Aristotle all too well recognised the fact that no example would in 
this case prove to be free of blame, while holding that the general applicability and inherent 
veracity of his theory goes unimpaired by the fact that it could in principle be assailed.
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In chapter fifteen of the Poetics, which leaves an impression of being rather frag-
mentary, Aristotle drops in passing several remarks on the importance of character in its 
own right within the tragic plot and prescribes four requirements which a poet is advised 
to strive to meet should he wish to evoke the inherently tragic feelings of pity and fear. 
By way of a hallmark explanation, some negative examples are given. It is the one for 
‘consistency’, the fourth requirement, that does prompt some locking of horns on part of 
Aristotle’s readership and, by nature of the example, Euripides scholarship. Reluctant as 
one is, there is no denying the fact that this example from Iphigenia in Aulis has drawn 
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a disproportionate amount of attention due to it being one of the relatively few1 in the Po-
etics to come from an extant tragedy of which we have considerable knowledge, albeit the 
posthumously (405 BC) staged draft still encourages reconstructions of varying merit.2
τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν. κἂν γὰρ ἀνώμαλός τις ᾖ ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος 
ὑποτεθῇ, ὅμως ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι. ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ 
ἀναγκαίας οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ, τοῦ δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἁρμόττοντος ὅ τε 
θρῆνος Ὀδυσσέως ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ καὶ ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις, τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι 
Ἰφιγένεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ ἱκετεύουσα τῇ ὑστέρᾳ.3
“And the fourth is consistency; for even if the person being imitated is an inconsistent sort, 
and that kind of character has been posited, still he should be consistently inconsistent. A 
case of baseness of character not required by any necessity, is, for example, Menelaus in the 
Orestes; of unsuitability and inappropriateness, the lamentation of Odysseus in the Scylla 
and the speech of Melanippe, and of inconsistency — the Iphigenia in Aulis; for the suppli-
ant has no resemblance to the later one.”4
The sheer volume of scholarly output these much-thought-about and thought-into 
lines have prompted testifies to the thrill every student of ancient drama feels when an 
opportunity to challenge (or defend) the philosopher’s idea lies, seemingly, within reach. 
U. von Wilamowitz, an early champion of Euripides, expressed in 1889 his bewilderment 
and discontent that Aristotle “so gröblich sich versehen kann, die aulische Iphigenie zu 
tadeln, weil sie nicht entweder lediglich als schlachtopfer weint, oder als heldenjungfrau 
mutvolle reden hält.”5 J. Markland well before that observed that we should rather praise 
Euripides for the fact that he “humani animi levitatem, et τὸ εὐμετάβλητον, et inconstan-
tiam in consiliis suis per tot instabiles dramatis personas repraesentaret”,6 thus represent-
1 See Schoder 1969, 75 for a list of literary sources cited in the Poetics; to take Euripides only, Aris-
totle cites three extant plays (IT, IA, Medea), two lost (Chresphontes, Melanippe), and one unknown; other 
instances refer to his work in general.
2 See Günther 1988, Diggle 1994, with Mastronarde 1996–1997, 201–202; Kovacs 1998, 270–272; 
2003, 77–103.
3 The text follows Tarán 2012 here reproducing Kassel 1965. The the ms variants and editor’s emenda-
tions, though curious per se, are mostly irrelevant for the present discussion. The established text is sound. 
Vettori supposes that before τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου an example of ἀνόμοιον was given, but Aristoteles was not 
obliged to exemplify all of his critical judgements.
4 Translation adopted from Else 1957, 455 with minor alterations to it. A. Schmitt 2008, 21 is adequate 
and clear: “Das Vierte ist, dass der Charakter konsistent sein soll. Denn auch wenn der, der das Vorbild für 
die Nachahmung bietet, sich selbst nicht treu bleibt, und ein solcher Charakter Gegenstand der Nachah-
mung ist, muss das Ungleichmäßige als dessen charakterliche Konstante dargestellt werden. Ein Beispiel 
für einen Charakter, der ohne Not als verdorben dargestellt wird, ist die Zeichnung des Menelaos im Orest. 
Ein Beispiel für ein Verhalten, das zu einem Charakter nicht passt und ihm nicht angemessen ist, gibt die 
Klage-Arie [threnos] des Odysseus in der Skylla und die Rede [rhesis] der Melanippe. Ein Beispiel für eine 
Charakterzeichnung, der es an Konstanz mangelt, bietet die Iphigenie in Aulis. Denn die flehentlich bittende 
Iphigenie hat keinerlei Ähnlichkeit mit der Iphigenie im späteren Verlauf des Stücks”. Bywater 1909, 43, who 
reads ὑποτιθεὶς in 1454a27, translates “even if inconsistency be part of the man before one for imitation as 
presenting that form of character”, which is verbose and complicated in the middle due to the participle. 
Something like ‘even if the original character (‘in the myth’, thus Lucas 1968, 160) is inconsistent and such a 
character is intended for representation (not, as Lucas, ibid., ‘supplied’ by the myth), they should be consist-
ently inconsistent’ could be offered as an alternative. 
5 Wilamowitz 1906, 115 (an introduction to his Heracles turned into the introduction). 
6 Markland 1811, 95, ad v. 1375. 
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ing τὸ ἀνώμαλον ὁμαλῶς. Aristotle scholars are careful to suppose that the philosopher 
had his own subjective reasons for such criticism, or pass over this passage in silence.7 
Argumentative defenses of the tragedian, quite surprisingly, can go along the lines of 
Aristotelian moral philosophy, with scholars looking for proofs of Iphigenia’s ‘constancy,’ ‘a 
being-equal-to-oneself ’ in the Nicomachean (1168b) and Eudemian (1240a) Ethics. Thus, 
M. McDonald offers grounds for Iphigenia’s consistency in her φιλία: a “reverent and duti-
ful daughter,” Iphigenia “listens well,” “respects her father’s lesson” and, seeing that “it is 
not her character that has changed, but her circumstances and her reaction to them”, she 
“acts naturally and nobly when she makes her final choice … and acquires immortal fame 
in the process”.8 Indeed, there is little real action in this play populated with men pressed 
hard by circumstances in which they shift and turn, a welcome foil for a heroic act of reso-
lution. It thus remains largely unexplained why Aristotle himself failed to interpret and 
justify Iphigenia’s behaviour in terms of his own moral philosophy which McDonald so 
admirably wields against him. The 1990s saw what seems a considerable surge in interest 
in this play and Iphigenia’s character in particular: W. Stockert in his commentary relies 
on the passage in the Rhetoric 1389a, where Aristotle observes a specific propensity of the 
young and inexperienced to impulsive, heroic deeds.9 Cf. Rhet. 1389a–b:
οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι. <…> εὐμετά-
βολοι δὲ καὶ ἁψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται 
(ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ πεῖναι), καὶ θυ-
μικοὶ καὶ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὀργῇ. καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ φιλοτιμί-
αν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι 
μέν εἰσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι (ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις), 
<…> καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι (θυμώδεις γὰρ καὶ εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν 
ποιεῖ· <…> καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπείνωνται, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων 
ἄπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὑτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο δ᾽ εὐέλπιδος).
“The young are eager by character and can readily do whatever they desire; <…> changeable 
and quickly tiring of their desires, they desire keenly, but soon cool down (for their desires 
are keen, but not strong, much like the thirst and hunger of the sick), they are passionate 
and irascible, and given to fits of strong emotion, unable to control them; being ambitious, 
they cannot bear to be slighted, and become indignant every time they think themselves 
wronged. They seek honours, being especially fond of victories (for youth desires superior-
ity, and a victory is some kind of superiority) <…> And they are more brave (for they are 
spirited and hopeful, the former makes them not afraid, the latter stirs them to courage) 
<…> They are high-minded (life has not yet humbled them, nor the virtue of necessity made 
7 Bywater 1909, 229 tacitly refers the reader to lines ll. 1211–1212 and 1368–1369. of the play; Lucas 
1968, 161: “such changes are rare in Greek tragedy; that of Neoptolemus in the Phil. is one with which nei-
ther A., nor anyone else could find fault… The use of masks must have worked against variations of character 
within the play.” They are much more numerous than Lucas would have it; Neoptolemus undergoes no real 
change, but is, on the opposite, true to his φύσις, which Aristotle could not have failed to observe; the masks 
in the 5th c. were neutral in expression. Tarán 2012, 267 comments on the meaning of ἡ ἱκετεύουσα and 
Moerbecke’s Lt. transl. ministrans (Minio-Paluello [1953] noted, that his ms probably read οἰκετεύουσα).
8 McDonald 1990, 69–84.
9 Stockert 1992, a study in ‘change of mind’ in Greek tragedy, Gibert 1995, along with a swell of ar-
ticles; see McDonald 1990, 69–70, n. 1 for an overview, and also Funke 1964, Knox 1966, Sansone 1991. For 
more exotic interpretations, see McDonald 1990, 69, n. 1. 
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itself known; and the thinking of one being worthy of great things is a sign of high-minded-
ness, this is a quality of one hopeful).”
(Transl. mine)
However, these insights did not find their way into the Poetics, and it seems to be 
not due to any dearth of understanding on part of Aristotle of the behaviour he so keenly 
observed elsewhere.
A number of arguments for Iphigenia’s integrity were offered by scholars of the last 
decades out of the dramatic situation itself: B. Knox holds that “the change of mind has 
been well prepared for in Euripides’ play — it comes as the climax of a series of swift and 
sudden changes of decision which is unparalleled in ancient drama”,10 (which is, however, 
no definite proof), with J. Gibert even establishing a pattern of mind-change, into which 
Iphigenia’s decision will fit;11 D. Sansone is likewise kind to Iphigenia and her poet, sug-
gesting that “witnessing the willingness of Achilles (who is in a situation similar to her 
own) to die for her sake, she is emotionally transformed”12 (it pays to remember that 
Achilles promises are verbal gymnastics), while W. Stockert holds that the simplicity of a 
girl whose hopes of marriage were frustrated gave way to a more mature decision due to 
the changed circumstances.13
Aristotle however, is not alone in his censure: H. Funke in a sound piece of criti-
cism held that Iphigenia speaks not with her own words and not from her own mind, but 
was deluded by the rhetoric of her deceitful father, thus making the wrong choice for the 
wrong reason;14 H. Siegel observes a case of “self-delusion”, making the best out of a hope-
less case, while M. Lefkowitz disposes of the situation in terms of “consent turned into a 
free choice”.15
Among the multitude of interpretations and justifications which tend to be off the 
point, a sound view expressed by A. Lesky and supported by J. C. Kamerbeek16 seems to 
be the only feasible solution: while astutely observing the qualities of young people in life 
(the passage in the Rhetoric 1389a–b cited above is easy proof), Aristotle could not suffer 
these in tragedy. 
Moreover, his very terminology may not be sufficient and its application overstrict; 
being theoretically well-grounded it is often incapacitated when it comes to fitting in the 
examples, and, as a result, there is evidently little to no place for the dramatically very ef-
fective (thus τραγικώτατος of 1453a 29–30) lability of a Euripidean character.
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